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The Intended Parent: The Power and Problems
Inherent in Designating and Determining Intent in
the Context of Parental Rights

Heather Kolinsky*
ABSTRACT

This Article seeks to consider and discuss the intent to parent and,
particularly, the use of the words intent and intentional in the context of
assigning legal parental rights. Problems and preferences have arisen
from the use of this paradigm and the notion that intent can be fixed at
any one point in time. This Article discusses how this historical use of
intent and intentional parenthood may impact the evolving field of
parental form, considering whether we will carry forward some of the
same problems and preferences into newer forms of the assignment of
legal parental rights.

* Heather M. Kolinsky, B.A. Stetson University, J.D., Rutgers School of Law - Camden,
LL.M. Candidate, Emory University School of Law. I would like to thank the
participants at the 2014 Emerging Family Law Scholars Conference at the Law and
Society Association Annual Meeting, particularly Professors Maxine Eichner, Dara
Purvis, and Bela August Walker, and the participants in the Panel Discussion on
Emerging Issues on Reproductive Rights at the 2014 Southeastern Association of Law
Schools Conference for their helpful comments and suggestions.
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The Article first frames the concept of who is a parent, and how that
decision is made from a legal standpoint under a traditional analysis.
Next, the Article discusses some of the problems that have arisen both in
the traditional assignment of parental rights, by and among heterosexual
married and unmarried parents, assisted reproductive technology, and
open adoption. The Article then moves into an assessment of more
modem issues of assignment of legal parental rights by examining four
distinct cases involving known donors in assisted reproductive
technology. After highlighting some of the pitfalls of the application of
the intended/intentional parent paradigm in more modern conceptions of
both childbirth and marital status, the Article considers how new
legislation seeks to address these problems by highlighting a new family
law enacted in British Columbia and a new statute in California. The
Article also points out how newer known donor assignments of rights
already have a predecessor in the form of open adoption.
Finally, the Article argues that if we do not pause and consider the
impact of how we have assigned legal parenthood in the past through
intent, we may be destined to repeat many of the same mistakes, and we
risk carrying forward prejudices and preferences that are inappropriate
given the realities of both modem reproductive technology and modern
family status.
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INTRODUCTION

Generally, a "parent" is a mother or father who is raising, nurturing,
and caring for a child and has some legally recognized relationship with
that child. The default presumption is that the child is the biological
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offspring of that parent. The "traditional" assumption is also that the
child has only two parents, a mother and a father, and that they are
married.' This definition is parentage in its simplest form, and the
foundation of the "invisible rules of legal parentage." 2 The traditional
family unit has been constructed based upon a presumption of a
biological connection and conformity with what is socially desirable.3
However, that initial family form can shift for any number of reasonsadoption, death, remarriage, assisted reproductive technology ("ART"),
or termination of parental rights. The law's need to assign legal
recognition to two people who are responsible for the care and nurture of
a child in this social construct causes the assignment to be artificially
rendered in such a way that often makes determining who is a parent
exceedingly complex. This complexity is driven by three things: (1)
societal expectations of how, and by whom, children should be raised;
(2) the determination that only two people can hold exclusive legal rights
to raise a child at any given time; and (3) the fluid interaction between
identity and intent within and among potential parents.
To navigate this complexity, the law often directly or indirectly
ascribes "intent" to a party in order to assign parentage. "Intent has a
powerful normative benefit" that can be useful in assigning parentage.4
Historically, the reliance on intent appears to have manifested itself in
two ways: "intended" parenthood and "intentional" parenthood. First,
the law has identified the gestational mother of a child as the "intended"
parent of that child, based on a presumption of biology and nurture
through pregnancy. 5 Second, the law has identified a woman's husband,
if she has one, as the "intended" father of that child based upon a legal
Thus, "intended"
presumption of paternity through marriage. 6
1. See generally Martha Fineman, Why Marriage?, 9 VA. J. SoC. POL'Y & L. 239,
247 n.21 (2001) (quoting Martha Fineman, Masking Dependency: The PoliticalRole of

Family Rhetoric,-81 VA. L. REV. 2181, 2182 (1995)); Mary Kay Kisthardt, Of
Fatherhood,Families and Fantasy: The Legacy of Michael H. v. Gerald D., 65 TUL. L.
REV. 585, 589 nn.29-30 (1991) (citing H. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL
POLICY 15-16 (1971)).
2. Dara E. Purvis, Intended Parentsand the Problems of Perspective, 24 YALE J.L.
& FEMINISM 210, 211 (2012); see also David Meyer, Parenthoodin a Time of Transition:
Tensions Between Legal, Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood,54 AM. J.
COMP. L. 125, 127 (2006).
3. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of
Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 248 (2006) (discussing
some of the underlying social and economic reasons for deferring to the "model" family
as the normative model).
4. Purvis, supra note 2, at 212.
5. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260 n.16 (1983) (quoting Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting)) ("The mother carries and
bears the child, and in this sense her parental relationship is clear.").
6. See generally Kisthardt, supra note 1, at 589 nn.29-30.
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parenthood was traditionally limited to presumed maternity and paternity
as conceived within a legal marriage.7 Marriage acted as a marker of
intent and a proxy for biology.
"Intentional" parenthood, on the other hand, fills the gaps intended
parenthood leaves behind. In this circumstance, a person desires to
parent a child but lacks the intended presumption provided by marriage
or gestation. 8 For instance, where a biological father is not married to the
child's biological mother, he loses the full force of his intended parent
protection and must demonstrate that he intends to parent a specific
child-thus justifying parentage based upon his intention to parent rather
than his biological connection to the child. 9 Additionally, in some cases,
intentional parenthood bolsters a weaker claim to intended parenthood.l°
As issues of parentage become more complex, this socially
constructed model of parentage has been strained to the breaking point.
Intended and intentional notions of parentage presume many social
norms that simply no longer exist as the only model-particularly heteronormative marriage and two-party conception (meaning one man, one
woman, his sperm, and her egg)." Thus, the landscape of modern
parentage resembles a broken trail of twists and turns where once a direct
line could be drawn.
In an attempt to expand this model to fit our new reality, the
concept of intended parent has changed from merely a marital proxy to a
designation for parents who commission ART conceptions and births.' 2
7. This conception was a necessity at a time when biological parentage could not be
determined with certainty. But, as Meyer notes, it was also a time when social and
biological parentage tended not to be in conflict. See Meyer, supra note 2, at 128.
8. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 654 (1972).
9. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65; Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 246 (1978); Stanley,
405 U.S. at 654. Moreover, even the stated intention to parent is itself insufficient and
must instead be exercised in a way society deems satisfactory. See, e.g., Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
10. See, e.g., Lehr, 463 U.S. at 248; Caban, 441 U.S. at 380; Quilloin, 434 U.S. at
255-56. With respect to unmarried fathers, the U.S. Supreme Court conceived the
"biology plus" test. It often serves as the basis for recognizing paternity and legal
parental rights in the face of competing custody claims. See Heather M. Kolinsky, The
Ties that Bind: Reevaluating Legal Presumptionsof Paternity,48 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 221,
229 (2014) (discussing how the "biology plus" test arose from the Supreme Court's
opinions in Quilloin, Caban, Lehr).
11. See Alana Semeuls, Sperm Donor, Life Partner,ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Dec. 8,

2014, 7:30 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/12/sperm-donor-lifepartner/383421/4/.
12. In re Paternity of F.T.R., 833 N.W.2d 634, 643 (Wisc. 2013) (quoting ABA
MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 102(19) (2008)) ("An 'intended
parent' is 'an individual, married or unmarried, who manifests the intent ... to be legally
bound as the parent of a child resulting from assisted or collaborative reproduction."');
see also In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 286-88 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
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Further, an argument has been made to extend the legal presumption of
paternity, situated in marriage based on intent, to same-sex couples,
thereby removing the gender preference that only permits men to be
granted presumptive paternity based on relational marital rights. 3
Continuing to perpetuate a system that favors maintaining the traditional
hetero-normative marital unit as the model family, or to make everything
else look like it, causes every person involved in the procreative process
to become more vulnerable to competing interpretations of the law and
different biases. The heart of this process, as perpetuated, is the
assumption that parentage can be linked to intent which is measured at
different times in the procreative process for different purposes.' 4 Intent
is often conceived of as a fixed point despite the reality that the only
thing that is ever fixed is the parties' biological relationship to the child.
This Article seeks to contemplate the connections made between
biology and legal status, to analyze the concept of intention in the law,
and to discuss both the benefits and the burdens of the system as
currently conceived. Part I will discuss the nature of becoming a parent,
focusing particularly on how legal rights are fashioned in and among
different types of intended and intentional parents. Then, Part II will
examine recent cases with respect to the problem of known donors in
ART to highlight the vulnerabilities inherent in the lack of clear state
guidance on these issues. Finally, Part III will discuss proposed
solutions to this problem and consider how to move forward in a way
that better protects parenthood and childhood from ambiguity and
uncertainty.
I.

BECOMING A PARENT

A.

If I Had To Explain It ...

Trying to encapsulate the complexities of legal recognition of
parentage is not a simple process. Rather, it often resembles a mad game
13. See Appleton, supra note 3.
14. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (finding that intent is
fixed prior to conception where the intended egg donor and the gestational carrier had
equal claims to maternity under California law and holding that "she who intended to
procreate the child-that is, she who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she
intended to raise as her own-is the natural mother under California law"); Laura Oren,
The Paradox of Unmarried Fathers and the Constitution: Biology 'Plus' Defines
Relationships; Biology Alone Safeguards the Public Fisc, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN &
L. 47, 101 (2004) (discussing a biological father's right to seek paternity based on
biology plus pursuant to Lehr); see also Jason P. v. Danielle S., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 789,
795-96 (Cal. Ct. App.) (allowing known sperm donor to seek parental rights upon
establishing a relationship with his child after regulated ART donation), review denied,
(Cal. Ct. App. 2014).
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of "rock, paper, scissors, lizard, Spock,"'15 where one person's claim to
parentage often trumps another's, only to be reordered based upon
changing status and relationships in and among adults, and always
complicated by the fact that, for the most part, only two "parents" can
win any game. Against the backdrop of assigning and recognizing
parentage are three shifting truths: the relationship between and among
the adults involved has a profound impact; intent is a moving target
highly dependent upon the point in time that a party asserts intent and
legal parentage; 6 and the assignment of legal parentage remains highly
gendered, hetero-normative, and limited. 17
1. Simple Biology Is Not Enough
In order to be a biological parent to a child, an individual must
contribute genetic material to the creation of an embryo.' 8 Thus, a man
contributes the sperm that fertilizes the woman's ova, an embryo forms,
and after a proper period of gestation, a child is born. 19 The right to
parent that child has been recognized as a fundamental right; 20 however,
conferring this right to the child's biological parents was not historically
determined by biology alone. Instead, a biological connection was
presumed when a woman was pregnant and gave birth to a child. 21 A
15. The game, popularized by The Big Bang Theory, has 15 variables that behave as
follows: scissors cut paper; paper covers rock; rock crushes lizard; lizard poisons Spock;
Spock smashes scissors; scissors decapitate lizard; lizard eats paper; paper disproves
Spock; Spock vaporizes rock; and rock crushes scissors. See The Big Bang Theory: The
Lizard-Spock Expansion (CBS television broadcast Nov. 17, 2008); see also Rock-PaperScissors: Additional Weapons, WIKIPEDIA (Jan. 2014), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rockpaper-scissors-lizard-Spock.
16. See Purvis, supra note 2, at 229-30.
17. See generally Martha Fineman, Women, Marriageand Motherhoodin the United
States: Allocating Responsibility in a Changing World, 2011 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3
(2011) (observing that the ideal family is marital, heterosexual, gendered, and
hierarchically ordered with a wage earner and a domestic laborer).
18. Topics: Biological Mother, AM.
Soc'Y FOR
REPROD.
MED.,
http://www.asrm.org/topics/detail.aspx?id=3634 (last visited Apr. 9, 2015); Topics:
Biological
Father,
AM.
Soc'Y
FOR
REPROD.
MED.,
http://www.asrm.org/topics/detail.aspx?id=3633 (last visited Apr. 9, 2015).
19. See Topics: Biological Mother, supra note 18; Topics: Biological Father, supra
note 18.
20. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (holding that parents have a
fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of their children); Pierce v.
Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that parents have a fundamental liberty
interest to direct the upbringing and education of children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923) (holding that a parent's liberty interest in the upbringing of his or her children
extends to the type of education children receive); see also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that individuals have a fundamental right to procreate).
21. THOMAS COVENTRY, A READABLE EDITION OF COKE UPON LITTLETON 243b § 399
(Saunders & Benning eds., 1830).
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father's right to parent his child was conferred via his legal relationship
with the child's mother-through a legal presumption of paternity based
on marriage. 22 "[F]atherhood remains, in significant part, a 'secondary'
or derivative relationship that requires an initial determination of the
child's first or 'primary' parent, the mother., 23 Important reasons for
these presumptions existed at the time they were created because there
was no simple way to determine biological parentage and24there was a
need to fix parentage at birth for a number of social reasons.
Where a father was not married to the child's mother, he was
presumptively not the intended parent or even an intentional parent, and
in the most extreme cases, he was excluded from his parental rights
entirely if the child's mother was married to another man. 25 The further
removed a biological father was from the traditional marital unit, the less
likely he would be conferred the status of intended parent.2 6 He was
forced to demonstrate his intentional parenthood by taking affirmative
actions to assert his rights to visitation, custody, and care, and even that
may not have been enough in certain circumstances.
This "basic" model of parenthood has created a multitude of
problems as both society and science have evolved. Marriage is no
longer the familiar social anchor it once was, and science allows more
than two people to be involved in the creation of life.27 Interestingly, as
the ability to determine biological paternity has become significantly
easier, lessening the need for a visible marker of paternity such as
marriage or the reliance on the concept of intent, the ability to determine
biological maternity based on gestation alone has become more
complicated due to the development of ART and gestational surrogacy in
particular.2 8
22. Id.
23. Appleton, supranote 3, at 282.
24. See Goodright ex dim Stevens v. Moss, (1777) 98 Eng. Rep. 1257 (K.B.) 1258
(adopting "Lord Mansfield's Rule," an evidentiary rule that prevented husband and wife
from testifying regarding their access to each other); Serafin v. Serafin, 258 N.W.2d 461,
464 n.1 (Mich. 1977) (Coleman, J., concurring); Appleton, supra note 3.
25.

See D.F.H. v. J.D.G., 125 So. 3d 146, 148 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013); see, e.g.,

Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 645 (1972); see also Appleton, supra note 3, at 294
(citing Robert B. v. Susan B., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785, 789 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)). See
generally Kolinsky, supra note 10.
26. See Kolinsky, supra note 10; Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983);
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Stanley, 405 U.S. at 645.
27. See Semeuls, supra note 11; Ariana Eunjung Cha & Sandhya Somashekhar,
FDA Panel Debates Technique that Would Create Embryos with Three Genetic Parents,
WASH. POST (Feb.
25, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/healthscience/fda-panel-debates-techinique-that-would-create-embryos-with-three-genetic
parents/2014/02/25/60371 c58-9e4d-11 e3-b8d8-94577ff66b28_story.html.
28. Gestational surrogacy involves three distinct parties: the mother who donates
the egg, the father who donates the sperm, and the carrier who provides the womb.
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2. The Intended/Intentional Parent Model
In American law, the intended parent isthe parent that initially
receives all of the legal rights to parent a child, unless that parent
affirmatively relinquishes those rights. Thus, in the simplest model, a
mother is the penultimate intended parent; she is
biological, gestational
"parent zero.",29 The presumption that she will want to parent, to be an
intentional parent, is so strong that she cannot affirmatively relinquish
those rights until after her child is born.3 0 Thus, she is not only an
intended parent, but she is deemed to be an intentional parent until she
demonstrates otherwise. This view of women as mothers fits our
traditional patriarchal model of woman as caregiver and, in essence,
places the burden of care squarely on a mother's shoulders.
If a biological mother chooses affirmatively to relinquish her status
as both intended and intentional parent, then she may allow the child to
be adopted by another person or persons. 31 The adoptive parents are not
the intended parents of the child, but they are the intentional parents
because they have expressed the desire to parent the child. In order for
these intentional parents to receive their legal rights, the biological
mother must affirmatively relinquish her rights, and the court must
approve the transfer of rights.32 Thus, in the case of adoption, the state
must be involved in the process to create these legal rights for the
intentional parents, and, while this process may begin prior to birth, it
does not culminate until after birth.33 Adoption is also significantly more
complicated, expensive, and time-consuming than traditional conception
and birth.34
Magdalena Gugucheva, Surrogacy in America, COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS 12
(2010), http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/pagedocuments/kaevej0a 1m.pdf.

The surrogate is not a biological donor of the ova in gestational surrogacy. Id.
29. Martha Fineman has even suggested that the rights framework should shift to
recognize the mother/child dyad as the caretaking unit instead.
ALBERTSTON FINEMAN,

See MARTHA

THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND

OTHER

TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 233 (1995).

30.

See generally Elizabeth J. Samuels, Time To Decide? The Laws Governing

Mothers' Consents to the Adoption of Their Newborn Infants, 72 TENN. L. REV. 509

(2005). This is also the presumption that in large part drove the Baby M case involving a
traditional surrogate's attempt to retain custody of a child she bore for another couple.
See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1248 (N.J. 1988). It is also one reason why many
people have a problem with surrogacy, particularly traditional surrogacy.
31. Samuels, supra note 30, at 527-29.
32. Id. at 572.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 522-23; How Much Does Adoption Cost?, INDEP. ADOPTION CTR.,
http://www.adoptionhelp.org/qa/how-much-does-adoption-cost (last visited Apr. 9, 2015)
("A voluntary adoption of a newborn through a non-profit agency will generally cost
between $10,000 and $25,000. Attorney adoptions of newborns generally run from
$20,000 to $30,000.").
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A biological father, on the other hand, is deemed an intended parent
if he has the appropriate relationship-marriage-with the biological
mother at the time of the child's birth. 35 In that case, the biological
father has the same rights that the biological mother possesses at birth by
virtue of his legal relationship with the biological mother; he is parent
zero once removed. If the biological father is not married to the mother,
however, then the law requires that the biological father affirmatively
demonstrate his intention to parent that child through positive behaviors
and actions, such as taking the child into his home, acknowledging the
child as his own, and seeking an affirmative declaration of paternity. 36
Thus, like an adoptive parent, he must prove his intention to parent and
may often be required to seek the assistance of the state to enforce that
right. But, even if an unmarried father intends to parent his child and
makes efforts to do so, the socially constructed assumption of intent that
attaches to a mother's husband may prevent him from having any rights
to his child, even though the mother's husband is not the child's
biological father.3 7 Further, the presumption of intent and marital proxy
for biology only functions in one direction; a married man's biological
child who is born to a woman
outside of his marriage does not become
3
the legal child of his wife.
The further removed the biological father is from the preferred
marital-model relationship, the harder it will be for him to demonstrate
his intention to parent his child.3 9 Thus, in a very real way, his
relationship with the biological mother will have a significant impact on
his ability to exercise his rights. But, at the same time, as an intended
parent, an unmarried biological father cannot forego his obligation to
financially support his child, nor can a father unilaterally seek to put his
child up for adoption.40 While a married biological father would have to
consent to an adoption of his child by another, an unmarried biological

35. See Kisthardt, supra note 1, at 589.
36. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983). But in some cases, even these efforts
are not enough. See Michael H.v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129-30 (1989).
37.

See Michael H, 491 U.S. at 110; Lehr, 463 U.S. at 248; Kisthardt, supra note 1,

at 606-07.
38. Appleton, supra note 3, at 237. Appleton explains:
Even the ... rule that presumes a man to be the father of a child born outside of
wedlock when he takes the child into his home and holds out the child as his
own operates asymmetrically: His legal relationship with the child becomes
established by such conduct, but the child does not become the legal child of
his wife.
Id. (citation omitted).
39. MichaelH.,491 U.S. at 110.
40. Oren, supra note 14, at 97-100; see also Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S.
Ct. 2552, 2556-57 (2013).
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father may not always be afforded that right.4 1 In a parallel twist, an
identified legal father who is married to the biological mother may seek
to remove the intended parent presumption by seeking to terminate his
parental rights and obligations if another man is determined to be the
child's biological father.42
Even with its gender and marriage biases, the intended parent
model, based on a mix of biology and marriage, lends itself easily to
application in heteronormative issues of adoption and ART. Traditional
adoption allows for intended parent(s) to convey their exclusive legal
rights to raise their child to a person or persons who have demonstrated
to the state's satisfaction that they are suitable intentional parents.4 3
Further, with respect to anonymous egg and sperm donation used to
the
couples,
challenged
heterosexual
reproductively
assist
to
donors
are
able
intended/intentional parent model works because the
affirmatively relinquish their rights and are protected from liability.
Anonymous donors are not intended parents, nor are they intentional
parents as they have displayed none of the characteristics of an intended
or intentional parent.4 4 Perhaps most critically, the donors have no
connection or relationship with the recipient family.4 5 The law and the
social construct, as conceived, permits the intended/intentional parent
41. See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2556-57.
42. See, e.g., Langston v. Riffe, 754 A.2d 389, 417 (Md. 2000) (permitting
disestablishment of paternity in accordance with statute). See generally Melanie Jacobs,
When Daddy Doesn't Want To Be Daddy Anymore: An Argument Against Paternity
FraudClaims, 16 YALE J. L. & FEM. 193 (2004).
43. See Meyer, supra note 2, at 130 (noting that adoption law still retained an
implicit preference for biological parenthood). Historically, "[a]lthough adoptive parents
were accorded full parental status and rights under the law, identical to those enjoyed by
biological parents, traditional adoption law and practice nevertheless implied that the
legitimacy of the adoptive relationship turned in some sense on its ability to mimic a
biological one." Id. at 131 (citing ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION,
INFERTILITY, AND THE NEW WORLD OF CHILD PROTECTION (1999); KATARINA WEGAR,
ADOPTION, IDENTITY, AND KINSHIP (1997); Elizabeth Bartholet, Beyond Biology: The
Politics of Adoption and Reproduction, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 5 (1995)); see also
Barbara L. Atwell, Nature and Nurture: Revisiting the Infant Adoption Process, 18 WM.
& MARY J. WOMEN & L. 201, 220-21 (2012).
44. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West 2014). If a married couple uses
artificial insemination with donor sperm with the assistance of a licensed physician, then
the husband is deemed the natural father of the child born of the marriage. Id at § 9:1744a. The statute further provides:
Unless the donor of semen and the woman have entered into a written contract
to the contrary, the donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in
artificial insemination of a woman other than the donor's wife is treated in law
as if he were not the father of a child thereby conceived and shall have no rights
or duties stemming from the conception of a child.
Id. at § 9:17-44b.
45. Not everyone thinks this is a good idea. See generally Naomi Cahn, Do Tell!
The Rights of Donor-ConceivedOffspring, 42 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1077, 1079-87 (2014).

2015]

THE INTENDED PARENT

framework to stretch in this manner to easily accommodate couples who
seek to become parents but require assistance to do so, because the result
is still the biological offspring of one parent, or one parent is the
gestational carrier for a couple who will undertake to act as the two
required intended parents. Even if the gestational commissioning mother
uses a donated egg, she still receives the intended parent recognition as
the donated ova are deemed hers by virtue of the donation itself.46 Thus,
the affirmative rights to procreate vested in the donor subsequently
transfer to the gestational mother upon donation for these purposes. But,
unlike adoption, or awarding parental rights in paternity actions, this
transfer of rights more or less occurs privately and requires no
intervention by the state beyond the legislative approval of an affirmative
waiver of rights by a donor upon anonymous donation.
Moving further away from the traditional biological binary of mom
and dad, but often still within the concept of "traditional" monogamous
relationships, is the use of the intended/intentional parent model by
same-sex couples. These relationships arguably lend themselves to the
intended parent model; however, because the model is highly gendered
and heteronormative, such application has proved problematic.4 s The
issue, as experienced by same-sex female couples, is that if one mother is
the biological mother of the child and thus, easily recognizable as the
intended parent, the second mother lacks the protection the legal
presumption provided to a married father, even if she is married to the
biological mother.49 If the non-biological mother does not have the
protection of the marriage presumption, she must demonstrate to the state
that she is entitled to recognition as an intentional parent just as an
unmarried biological father would be required to do. 50 This requires the
biological mother's consent and public intervention in a private marriage,
which the state generally avoids. 51 The issues become even thornier
when discussing same-sex male parents because the all-important "parent
zero" is not part of the marital relationship. In such cases, the biological
commissioning father is afforded few rights because he is not married to
46. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 742.14 (2014) ("The donor of any egg . . . shall
relinquish all maternal ... rights and obligations with respect to the donation.").
47. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 2 of 2015 Reg.
Sess.).

48.

Stu Marvel et al., Listening to LGBTQ People on Assisted Human Reproduction:

Access to Reproductive Materials, Services, and Facilities, in ASSISTED HUMAN
REPRODUCTION ON TRIAL: CHALLENGES OF REGULATING SURROGACY, GAMETE DONATION
AND REPRODUCTIVE SERVICES 1 n.2 (Trudo Lemmens ed., 2014).

49. See, e.g., D.M.T.v. T.M.H., 129 So. 3d 320, 328 (Fla. 2013).
50. Id.
51. This is the reason why the Court in Michael H. was willing to terminate biology
plus type parental rights in favor of the relational rights in the marriage itself. See
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 113 (1989).
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the surrogate, and the non-biological father is afforded no rights, even if
donated ova are used. Despite some of the complexities of same-sex
parenting, the law has slowly, some would say glacially, moved to
recognize the rights of same-sex partners as parents, particularly those
same-sex parents within a legal marriage. 52
B.

Thinking Outside the Spock Box: Open Adoption

In thinking through the application of the intended/intentional
parent model, open adoption adds another dimension to the conversation.
Open adoption contemplates reallocating the bundle of rights given to
parents in such a way that both the birth parents and the adoptive parents
have a relationship with the child.5 3 In a traditional closed adoption, the
birth parents cede all of their parental rights to the adoptive parents,
transferring care, custody, and control of their biological child to the new
legal parents.54 It is much like an anonymous gamete donation in the
sense that further contact with the adoptive family and the child is not
contemplated. Although a child who is adopted in this manner may be
able to know the identity of and perhaps even meet her birth parents if
she wishes at some point in the future, the understanding is that her
biological parents will not be part of her life.55 Essentially, the biological
parents wholly cede their intended and intentional parent status to the
adoptive parents.
Open adoption provides a slightly different model. In an open
adoption, the birth parents and adoptive parents have some sort of
relationship, and an expectation exists that the birth parents will remain
in the child's life and be known to the child.56 Open adoption
52. See Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 663 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316
(2014) (noting that the number of children being raised by same-sex couples supported an
argument that marriage to protect unplanned pregnancy was not a good enough reason to
preclude same-sex marriage).
53. Samuels, supra note 30, at 527 n.131 (citing CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM.,
CWLA STANDARDS OF EXCELLENCE FOR ADOPTION SERVICES 142 (rev. ed. 2000)) ("The
CWLA describes open adoption as an 'arrangement that recognizes the child's connection
to both the birth family and the adoptive family by supporting interaction among the birth
parents, adoptive parents, and the child through telephone calls, correspondence, or
personal contact, depending upon the particular situation.').
54. See Atwell, supra note 43, at 233 n. 131. Atwell notes:
A closed adoption is one in which the parties to the adoption do not share
identifying information. To facilitate the privacy of the parties, the original
birth certificates are sealed and a new one created with the names of the
adoptive parents.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
55. See id.
56. See Tammy M. Somogye, Opening Minds to Open Adoption, 45 U. KAN. L. REV.
619, 619 (1997) (quoting Marianne Berry, Risks and Benefits of Open Adoption, in 3 THE
FUTURE OF CHILDREN 125, 126 (Richard E. Behrman ed., 1993)) ("Open adoption is 'the
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contemplates that the legal rights to care, custody, and control of the
child will belong to the adoptive parents, but the birth parents will play
some sort of social role in the child's life based upon the birth parents'
relationship with the adoptive parents.5 7 Open adoption may also take
place in juvenile dependency settings when biological parents' legal
rights are terminated. 8 This flexibility allows the biological parents to
remain in contact with, and perhaps have visitation with, their child after
the termination of their biological parents' rights.5 9
The question arises whether, as an intended parent who has ceded
legal parental rights, a birth parent retains some sort of intentional parent
status. If an intended parent, from a social perspective, is thought of as
someone who has a biological connection to a child, recognizes the child
as their own, seeks to provide for the child (albeit through another), and
has some relationship with that child, then a birth parent in an open
adoption could be considered an intentional parent under the traditional
model.6 ° Conferring intentional parent status on a birth parent in an open
adoption would not, however, mean that the state could grant a birth
parent superior legal rights over the adoptive parents, as those rights have
been affirmatively transferred to the adoptive parents. Based on the
traditional model, conferring intentional parental status on a birth parent
means the birth parent would satisfy the definition of an intentional
parent who may be able to assert some sub-set of parental rights,
particularly in the case of an adoption agreement that afforded any such
rights.
The same can be said of another type of open adoption: adoptions
resulting from the loss of parental rights in juvenile dependency cases.
To some extent, the recognition of the importance of keeping a biological
parent in a child's life, even if that parent is unfit to raise the child, is
framed in terms of the connection that remains between parent and child
sharing of information and/or contacts between the adoptive and biological parents of an
adopted child, before and/or after the placement of the child, and perhaps continuing for
the life of the child."').

57. Id.at 621-22.
58. See generally Joshua Gupta-Kagan, Non-Exclusive Adoption and Child Welfare,
66 ALA. L. REV. 715 (2015) (discussing the benefits of allowing non-exclusive adoption

in termination of parental rights and dependency proceedings and statutes that have
permitted it).

59. Id.
60. The author is not advocating that birth parents should have legally recognized
parental rights that might conflict with the adoptive parents. But, in thinking through the
idea of intentional parenthood, particularly in conjunction with an expanded notion of
parental form beyond the two-parent model, it becomes important to consider how far
that model will extend and what types of rights should be included within it, including
heretofore unrecognized rights of an intended parent in an open adoption type of
situation.
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and which can form the basis of intent. 6 The distinction between the
two types of open adoption, in terms of intent, is that the former
contemplates a relationship that has not yet developed and is inchoate,
while the latter recognizes a relationship that already exists and the
benefit of maintaining that realized relationship has been identified.
Thus, open adoption shares some of the same markers for intended and
intentional parenthood as known donors in ART in that a known donor in
ART has some relationship with the commissioning parents-they are
known to each other and often contemplate maintaining some type of
relationship beyond the birth of the child. The extent of that relationship
may be even more extensive than that contemplated by parties in an open
adoption because the nature of the ART process is in many ways more
deliberate. There, the intended parents who seek to use ART to have a
child may seek out the known donor to participate in the process prior to
conception rather than developing a relationship after the birth mother in
an open adoption becomes pregnant.
II. WHEN INTENDED PARENT BECOMES A LEGAL CATEGORY
While the contours of intended and intentional parent have always
been present in the determination of parentage, it is fair to say the
specific terms did not always have a legal meaning of their own.62 Legal
meanings have changed with the advent of ART and, specifically, with
the advent of surrogacy. Thus, while anonymous sperm and egg
donation allowed reproductive donors to maintain a plausible distance so
long as the intentional mother was also the gestational mother, this
distance, both real and perceived, disappeared where parties used known
donors or where a surrogate became involved in the baby-making
process. Courts have held that, in these cases, a non-biological parent
can be given "intended parent" status prior to, or after, birth based on the
agreement of the parties.63 In fact, Robertson has advocated that "'if
bearing, begetting, or parenting children is protected as part of personal
privacy or liberty, those experiences should be protected whether they
are achieved coitally or noncoitally' and that '[o]nly substantial harm to
tangible interests of others should ... justify restriction [on the use of

61. Although this type of adoption is usually done for the benefit of the child and in
the hope that an open adoption will ease the transition for a child who has been removed
from his or her parents after an extended period of time.
62. Instead the Court has spoken in terms of the parents' "intention" as demonstrated
through the act of marriage or established relationship. See generally Lehr v. Robertson,

463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 665 (1972).
63.

See generally Purvis, supra note 2.
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reproductive technologies].' 64 The problem is, particularly with respect
to surrogacy, the lack of uniformity in the surrogacy laws.65
"Donor gametes," which are sperm or egg donations, are used by
many groups of people across the spectrum-single, married, straight,
gay, infertile, and fertile but otherwise incapable of conceiving without
assistance. 66 "Having a child through donor conception creates new
family relationships, but the dominant paradigm [remains] health law
with its focus on patients., 6' Less thought has been given to the social
ramifications of a child being told or not being told that they are donorconceived. 68 And, conversely, less thought has been given to whether a
from the donation, or the
donor can know what children have resulted
69
donor's willingness to be a "known" donor.
Known donors, both true donors and donors who contribute in nontraditional relationships where there is no true donation but rather a
utilization of ART methods to accomplish procreation, clearly illustrate
the problems that arise when new conceptions of family are shoehorned
into an existing system that never contemplated their existence.70 Donor
cases reflect a confluence of several issues within the "traditional" family
law model and the way in which the law must adapt and where it has
failed to adapt.71 While issues related to known donors have been
discussed frequently over the last 25 years, focusing on recent cases
highlights the lingering problems that remain and helps explain why the
shifting sands of intent have made these cases even harder.
A.

The Easy Case

William Breit and Beverly Mason, an unmarried heterosexual
couple in Virginia, turned to ART to have a child. 2 The child was
conceived through in vitro fertilization using Breit's sperm and Mason's
64. Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to
the Determinationof Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 854 (2000) (quoting JOHN

A.

ROBERTSON,

CHILDREN

OF

CHOICE: FREEDOM

AND

THE NEW

REPRODUCTIVE

TECHNOLOGIES 39-41 (1994)).

65. See Darra L. Hoffman, "Mama's Baby, Daddy's Maybe:" A State-By-State
Survey of Surrogacy Laws and Their Disparate Gender Impact, 35 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 449, 450 (2009).

66. See generally Cahn, supra note 45, at 1079-87.
67. Id. at 1087.
68. Id. at 1096.
69. Id. at 1109.
70. See In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27, 29 (Colo. 1989) (reasoning that the parental rights
of a semen donor are least clearly understood when the semen donor is known and the
recipient is unmarried); K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 675 (Cal. 2005) (concerning an egg
donation to lesbian partner for gestation).
71. In reR.C., 775 P.2dat29; K.M., 117 P.3dat 675.
72. See L.F. v. Breit, 736 S.E.2d 711,715 (Va. 2013).
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eggs, with Mason serving as the gestational mother.73 Prior to their
child's birth in 2009, the parties entered into a written custody and
visitation agreement, and after their child's birth, the parties jointly
executed a written acknowledgment of paternity identifying Breit as the
child's legal and biological father.74
As with all legal cases of this nature, the relationship fell apart, and
the couple separated. But, Breit continued to financially support the
child; he visited regularly and took an active role in his child's life until
Mason unilaterally terminated all contact.75 Breit was forced to file a
petition to determine parentage with the court, and Mason argued in
response that "Breit was barred from being [the child's] legal parent
because he and Mason were [not] married and [the child] was conceived
through [ART] .,,76 Virginia Code § 20-158 provided that the "donor is
not the parent of a child conceived through assisted conception, unless
the donor is the husband of the gestational mother., 77 The Code was
enacted specifically to protect married parents who use ART.78 In
essence, Mason argued that Breit's status as a donor negated his paternity
claim as the child's biological and social father because the statute
protecting donors negated his intent to parent. The court dismissed
Breit's petition on that basis.79
The court of appeals reversed the decision and held that Breit, as a
known sperm donor, could maintain an action for paternity where both
parties executed an uncontested Acknowledgment of Paternity after the
child's birth. 8° Despite the language in the statute, the court held that the
parties' conduct after the birth of their child conferred parental status on
Breit.81 In reaching this decision, "[t]he Court of Appeals concluded that
it would create a 'manifest absurdity' to interpret Code § 20-158(A)(3) to
foreclose any legal means for an intended,unmarried, biological father to

73. Id.at 715.
74. Id.
75. Id.

76. Id. at 715-16.
77. Interestingly, this statute also provides for who is a legal parent in surrogacy and
indicates that regardless of who the intended parents may be, the surrogate, and even
more interestingly, her husband, are deemed the legal parents of the child if neither of the
intended parents is the genetic parent of the resulting child, and further, the child must be
adopted by the intended parents. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158 (LEXIS through 2015
Reg. Sess. Assemb.).
78. Breit, 736 S.E.2d at 717 (noting that the assisted conception statute was enacted
in response to Welborn v. Doe, 394 S.E.2d 732 (Va. Ct. App. 1990), which held that "the
only sure way for the husband of the gestational mother to secure parental rights" was to
adopt a child born via ART and donor sperm).
79. Id. at 716.
80. Id. at 716.
81. Id.
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of assisted
establish legal parentage of a child born as a result
82
'donor."'
a
as
status
his
of
virtue
by
merely
conception,
The Virginia Supreme Court approached the issue differently and
addressed the equal protection problem created if the ART statute was
read to exclude Breit as a legal parent after he had established a parentchild relationship.83 The court found that if the ART statute was not
harmonized with existing legal means to establish paternity, then it
would "unconstitutionally infringe on Breit's fundamental parental
rights" and "absolutely foreclose any legal means for Breit to establish84
parentage .. .solely by virtue of his status as an unmarried donor."

The supreme court upheld the court of appeals' harmonization of the
ART and paternity statutes and permitted a known donor with an
established relationship with a child to seek legal recognition of
paternity, as well as visitation and custody.85
As an initial observation, Breit more than satisfied even the most
stringent requirements for acknowledgment of paternity for an unmarried
biological father: he had been present throughout the pregnancy; he had
acknowledged the child as his own; and he had developed a parental
relationship with the child, albeit a short one. 6 He easily fit within the
simple, standard understanding of who could be a parent, absent the
intervening action of Virginia's donor statute that negated his parental
status based upon his marital status.
Ultimately, Breit's marriage-like relationship with Mason, his
ability to fill an open parental slot (in the two-parent scheme), and the
recognition that Breit was both the intended and intentional parent
allowed him to prevail. But because the statute favored married couples,
Breit was subjected to a challenge to his parenthood that would never
have occurred but for his unmarried status and his additional status as a
"donor." Thus, the "intended parent by marriage" proxy is carried into
donor statutes. The appellate court and the supreme court diverged,
however, in how to protect that parental right and fix the problem. The
appellate court considered the parties' intent priorto the child's birth and
sought to enforce the intent of the parties at that time. The supreme
court, on the other hand, considered the parties' conduct after the child
was born to assign intent and find that Breit could not be excluded from
claiming paternal rights based solely on his marital status.

82. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Breit v. Mason, 718 S.E.2d 482, 489 (Va. App. Ct.
2011).

83.
84.
85.
86.

Breit, 736 S.E.2d at 721-22.
Id. at 722.
Id. at 724.
Id. at 715.
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A Slightly Harder Case

In a strikingly similar case, a biological mother who donated ova to
her lesbian partner was initially denied legal parental recognition because
she did not satisfy the exception to the donor definition in Florida's ART
statute.87
The statute did not discriminate between married and
unmarried donors, but instead discriminated between same-sex and
opposite-sexed donors by only protecting commissioning couples, which
were defined as the mother and the father. 88 Thus, as a same-sex partner,
donor, and the non-gestational mother, she was deemed to be a donor
who had affirmatively relinquished her parental rights to her child.8 9
In T.MH. v. D.MT.,90 the court of appeals held that T.M.H., as the
biological mother, was not a donor within the meaning of the ART
statute because that was not her intent, and that the application of the
ART statute, which required an egg donor to relinquish all of her
maternal rights to a resulting child, violated her constitutionally protected
parental rights to that child. 9' The statute required an affirmative
relinquishment of rights for gamete donors with only two exceptions:
one for fathers in preplanned adoptions and one for "commissioning
couples," defined as the intended "mother and father" of the child. 92 The
parties had been in a same-sex domestic partnership when they sought
ART to have a child together and specifically chose this method to have
a connection to the child, one mother as birth mother, one as biological
mother. 93 After the child's birth, they parented their child together as
planned, but when the couple's relationship ended, the gestational
94
mother sought to deny the biological mother any rights.
The problem presented in this scenario was two-fold. First, the
statute clearly exempted commissioning couples-traditional intended
parents-from the relinquishment of rights based on donation, but the
definition limited intended parents to a mother and a father in a
heterosexual relationship. Second, the parties' actions after the donation
was made invoked the constitutionality of depriving the biological

87. T.M.H. v. D.M.T., 79 So. 3d 787, 790 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011), aff'd in part,
129 So. 3d 320 (Fla. 2013).
88. Id. at 790-91 (citing FLA. STAT. § 742.14 (2011)).
89. ld. at 789-90.
90. T.M.H. v. D.M.T., 79 So. 3d 787 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011), aff'd in part, 129
So. 3d 320 (Fla. 2013).
91. Id. at 798.
92. Id. at 809; see FLA. STAT. § 742.13(2) (2014) ("'Commissioning couple' means
the intended mother and father of a child who will be conceived by means of assisted
reproductive technology using the eggs or sperm of at least one of the intended parents.").
93. T.MH., 79 So. 3d at 788-89.
94. Id. at 797-98.
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mother of her fundamental rights via statute where a parental relationship
had developed.
The appellate court focused heavily on the parties' intent at the time
of donation and found that the biological mother was not a donor under
the statute based on her subjective intent at the time of the donation. On
review, however, the Florida Supreme Court clearly addressed the equal
protection issues that arose at both moments in time-at the time of
donation and at the time of the challenge to the biological mother's
fundamental right to parent. 95 The Florida Supreme Court held that the
statute was unconstitutional to the extent that same sex commissioning
parents were treated differently, and the court recognized and protected
the biological mother's fundamental due process right to be a parent to
her child, based on a developed relationship.9 6 The Florida Supreme
Court echoed the appellate court in holding that this was not an all-ornothing proposition between two parents and that T.M.H. retained her
right to parent her child, presumably based on the application of the
statute to the women as a "commissioning97 couple" without the
unconstitutional limitation of mother and father.
The appellate court's reliance on the parties' intent at the time of
Generally, intended and intentional
donation raises a concern.
parenthood was not fixed at conception; rather, intended and intentional
parenthood was fixed at birth. Under the standard intended/intentional
parent analysis, only the gestational mother would have been the
intended parent. Technically, the biological mother had no rights based
on biology alone because she was not the gestational mother and not the
husband or the biological father of the child such that a presumption of
paternity could attach. To the extent the courts in T.MH. considered the
biological mother's parental claim in a paternity context, she was able to
demonstrate the hallmarks of intended and intentional parenthood-and
satisfy the requirement of biology plus-permitting her to establish legal
parenthood. The gestational mother was afforded rights at birth based on
gestation alone even though she had no biological connection to the
child. There is a concern that all gestational mothers could make similar
claims, although this one was clearly distinct because of the nature of the
relationship. 98
95. D.M.T. v. T.M.H., 129 So. 3d 320, 328 (Fla. 2013).
96. ld. at 328. The protection the court gave in this case is similar to the protection
afforded an unmarried father in such circumstances.
97. Id.
98. There are scholars who have suggested that gestational mothers do and should
have rights. See, e.g., Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Mothering for Money: Regulating
Commercial Intimacy, 88 IND. L.J. 1223, 1226 (2013); Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Gestation:
Work for Hire or the Essence of Motherhood? A Comparative Legal Analysis, 9 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL'Y 91, 134 (2002).
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Despite the legal gymnastics, the decision to award parental rights
was easy here, with two parents who intended to parent the resulting
child together and who both had a biological connection to the child
through ovum or gestation. The courts also managed to avoid conflict
with the donor statute, which was designed primarily to protect
anonymous donors and donees.
C. A Not So Simple Case
Most donor statutes contemplate fixing intended parent status upon
donation, thereby ensuring that rights and obligations are clearly
delineated even if legal intervention is later required to confirm those
rights. Thus, intended parent status is assigned based upon who is
donating and to whom they are donating, and the status reflects the
understanding of the parties at the time a donation is made or conception
occurs. When the parties' intentions change after the fact, for example,
when a non-traditional relationship ends, the court, through an equal
protection analysis and application of traditional intended and intentional
parent rules, has enforced the parties' intent at the time of the donation to
the extent that the law has failed to do so.99 But what happens when a
known biological donor decides that he or she wants to be recognized as
a legal parent? How can a court balance the current intended/intentional
parent model with the law and the parties' wishes? Does that balance too
easily favor the heteronormative two-parent model of parentage? What
risks do we incur by invoking intention at' the point of donation and
conception instead of applying the rules as conceived?
Jason Patric had no intention of being a father. 100 After several
attempts to have a child with his then-girlfriend Danielle, he agreed to
donate sperm so that she could become pregnant and raise the child
alone. 10
Patric asked that his donation remain confidential.'0 2
California Family Code § 7613103 permitted this because Patric, as the
donor, was not married to Danielle; there was no written agreement to
the contrary prior to the donation and insemination; and they used a
licensed facility. 0 4 The couple signed informed consent waivers at the
99. See, e.g., D.MT., 129 So. 3d at 328; L.F. v. Briet, 736 S.E.2d 711, 722-24 (Va.
2013).
100. Jason P. v. Danielle S., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 789, 790 (CalCt. App.), review
denied, (Cal. Ct. App. 2014).
101. Id. at 791. Danielle had by then moved out and was looking into artificial
insemination and raising the child alone. Id.
102. Id.
103. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 2 of 2015 Reg. Sess.).
104. JasonP., 171 Cal Rptr. 3d at 790. California Family Code § 7613 provides:
The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician and surgeon or to a
licensed sperm bank for use in assisted reproduction of a woman other than the
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clinic, and Patric donated sperm that was used in an in vitro fertilization
procedure for Danielle. 0 5 Gus, Danielle's son, was born in 2009, and for
two and a half years Patric had some contact with Gus, including
personal visits and Skype calls. 10 6 Gus also called Patric "Dada."' 1°7 All
went according to plan until the parents' relationship failed and Danielle
permitted no further contact between Patric and Gus. 0 8 As a result,
Patric sought parental rights to Gus.10 9
Danielle argued that, pursuant to their agreement, Patric agreed to
give up his parental rights prior to Gus's birth." 10 The clear intent of the
parties at the time of donation was that he was simply a donor, no
different than an anonymous donor, and covered by the applicable statute
in California for donors."' Patric made two arguments. First, that he
was a presumed parent as an unmarried biological father who had
established a relationship with his son, and second that he was, in fact, an
in the forms he signed when
intended parent based on language
2
consenting to the ART procedure."1
The trial court found that the donor statute was not unconstitutional
as applied to Patric.' 3 The court noted that the public policy choice
made by the legislature was not unconstitutional, finding that
the Legislature has weighed competing public policies regarding
paternity and sperm donors, and has reconciled those considerations
by affording "to unmarried women a statutory right to bear children
by artificial insemination (as well as a right of men to donate semen)
without fear of a paternity claim [and] likewise provided men with a
unmarried
statutory vehicle for donating semen to married and
4
women alike without fear of liability for child support. "1

donor's spouse is treated in law as if he were not the natural parent of a child
thereby conceived, unless otherwise agreed to in a writing signed by the donor
and the woman prior to the conception of the child.
§ 7613(b). The written agreement provision came after the IVF procedure in this case so
that the court did not directly consider its applicability because the parties did not have
such an agreement. Jason P., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 791, 797.
105. Id.at 790.
106. Id. at 792.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. JasonP., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 792
110. Id. at 791.
111. Id. at 794; see also Steven S. v. Deborah D., 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 482, 487 (Cal.
App. Ct. 2005) (finding that a known donor has no right to claim paternity).
112. JasonP., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 791.
113. Id. at 793.
114. Id.
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The appellate court found, conversely, that the ART statute could not be
used to prevent Patric's attempt to maintain a paternity claim. 15 - The
court specifically found that it was inappropriate to prevent Patric, as a
biological father, from alleging that he satisfied the "presumed parent"
requirement of § 7611 of the California Code because it gave him fewer
rights than any other unmarried biological father.' 16 The court held that
"a sperm donor who has established a familial relationship with the child,
and has demonstrated a commitment to the child and the child's welfare,
can be found to be a presumed parent even though he could' not
establish
17
paternity based upon his biological connection to the child." "
The court seemed to miss the point that as a "donor," Patric was not
in the same position as an unmarried biological father because he had
affirmatively assented to giving up his parental rights pursuant to the
statute by virtue of his donation status. 18 The court also disregarded the
fact that Patric had no legal relationship or any legal-type relationship
with Danielle at the time. Although the court permitted Patric to
maintain a paternity action, single mothers received some small
consolation from the court's ruling, as the court explained that "holding
that a sperm donor is not precluded from establishing presumed
parentage does not mean that a mother who conceives through assisted
reproduction and allows the sperm donor to have some kind of
relationship with the child necessarily loses her right to be the sole
parent.""19 Instead, the question is whether that relationship has become
a "familial relationship.' 120 The court then chose to move beyond
traditional intended/intentional parent relations and even "marriage as
proxy," in this circumstance. Patric's status as Gus's biological father,
and the absence of a second legally recognized parent, may explain the
court's willingness to do so.
While Patric's argument regarding the informed consent form
failed, it deserves closer attention.
Patric argued that the 2011
amendment to the donor statute, which permitted parties to agree in
writing that an unmarried donor would be considered the father, should
apply retroactively. He also argued that the informed consent forms he
and Danielle signed indicated their intent that Patric be Gus's father.' 2'
115. Id. at 795.
116. Id.
117. Jason P., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 796.
118. Id.
119. Id.at 797.
120. Id. Thus, the court suggests that a mother who wishes to be the sole parent
simply ensure she does not cross that line and create a relationship where the sperm
donor can claim he received the child into his home and held him out as his own.
121. Id. at 798. Both courts decided this issue without considering whether the
amendment applied retroactively.
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Upon arriving at the fertility clinic, Patric was required to sign
forms related to Danielle's procedure that included a block for
identifying the "intended parents." 122 Danielle's argument was that
"intended parent" referred only to the biological material donor.123 The
problem, however, is that the definition offered by Danielle is not the
definition that has been ascribed to the term intended parent when used
in the ART context, although it would correctly describe a traditional
biological parent. Instead, the form should have reflected a different
term in order to properly identify Patric as a donor. The language and
designations in ART are of critical importance because the rights being
assigned, abandoned, or reassigned are wholly outside the realm of what
is traditionally understood in conception. Precision matters. To the
extent courts have failed to follow through to the logical conclusion
demanded by ART statutory definitions of intended parent, courts have
done so on equal protection grounds when the parties' initial intent is
clear and there is no conflict between the initial intent and the realized
acts post-birth. 24 Resolving these conflicting claims of parental rights
then requires a legal parsing of language used on a standard consent form
without considering what the intention of the parties really was, let alone
whether that intention changed after Gus's birth, when his mother
allowed Patric to become a parent in any form. Ultimately, the court
returned to consider the intent of the parties, not the language of the
forms, and found that "[t]he fact that Jason is listed in the spaces for
'Intended Parent' says nothing
about the parties' understanding regarding
125
his legal status as a parent."
In one sense, Patric's claim as an unmarried biological donor parent
is no different than the claims presented in L.F. v. Breit126 and TMH., to
the extent that the supreme court in each state foreclosed an examination
of the intent of the parties at the time of donation and focused solely on
the parties' behavior after the child was born. Under the traditional
intended/intentional parent analysis, this is the right result. So why is
Patric's case more troubling than the others? For one, if the situation had
been reversed and Patric did not seek custody but Danielle sought child
support, there is a high likelihood that Danielle would have lost her bid

122. Jason P., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 798. These were informed consent forms for the
procedures related to the IVF procedure, including micromanipulation, oocyte collection,
embryo cryopreservation, and embryo transfer. Id.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., L.F. v. Breit, 736 S.E.2d 711, 722-24 (Va. 2013); D.M.T. v. T.M.H.,
129 So. 3d 320, 328 (Fla. 2013).
125. JasonP., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 798.
126. L.F. v. Breit, 736 S.E.2d 711 (Va. 2013).
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In addition, the case's result

creates instability and uncertainty where there should be none. In Breit
and TMH., the result dovetailed with the initial intent of the parties.
Thus, the parties' intent and post-birth behavior were congruent. Here,
the parties never intended to parent together, and the court's decision
seems to be based more on maintaining the two-parent model to the
exclusion of a single-parent model. The court also seems to ignore the
fact that the legislature provided for this kind of protection in 2011 when
it permitted the parties to enter into a written agreement to have the
donor be treated as a parent. The court's decision appears to render that
requirement moot, allowing the donor to rely on post-birth conduct to
claim parental rights even without complying with the statute as written.
As a result of this case, the California legislature proposed a new
law, Senate Bill 115 ("SB 115"), which would amend § 7613 to permit a
known donor to claim paternity rights based on the holding out and
established relationship standard despite the requirements of the donation
statute. 28 The amendment would, in essence, allow a biological father
who intended to be only a sperm donor and who had no intention of
parenting, to change his mind and seek parental rights as long as he could
demonstrate he otherwise acted as any other unmarried biological father
in terms of holding the child out as his own and having some sort of
relationship with the child. SB 115 would allow any interested party,
notwithstanding his treatment under § 7613 as a sperm donor, to have
standing to bring an action at any time for the purpose of determining the
existence or nonexistence of a father-and-child relationship presumed on
the "holding out" standard in § 761 1(d). The sperm donor would still
have to prove he met the standard of a presumed father by proving he
received the child into his home, held the child out as his own, and had a

127. In finding in favor of Patric, the Appellate Court made the same observation in
supporting its decision to permit Patric to maintain a paternity suit under § 7613,
explaining that:
For example, suppose an unmarried couple who had tried unsuccessfully to
conceive a child naturally, finally was able to conceive through assisted
reproduction. They then got married, after conception but before the birth of
the child, and raised the child together. After several years, they divorced and
the mother sought child support because she could not afford to care for the
child on her own. Under Danielle's interpretation of section 7613(b), the
mother's ex-husband would have no obligation to support the child because he
was a sperm donor under section 7613(b) and could not be found to be the
child's presumed father under section 7611, despite having been married to the
mother at the time of the child's birth and having raised the child as his own.
The Legislature could not have intended this result.
Jason P., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 797.
128. Meldie Moore, Senate Bill 115 Would Give Sperm Donors Standing To Petition
for Paternity,ORANGE COUNTY LAW., Sept. 2013, at 38, 38.
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relationship with the child under129§ 7611. If parentage is proven, then the
father may seek custody rights.
A move toward permitting such a claim also moves away from the
traditional model in ART cases in California, where the intent of the
parties is established prior to birth. 130 This approach to known donors
also impermissibly tweaks the ART intended parent model in a way that
gives primacy to intentional parenthood, which not only changes the
paradigm but takes the paradigm completely out of the traditional notions
of intended and intentional parenthood. Legally, the state is, in essence,
giving any adult male the ability to seek paternity rights to a child to
whom he has no other legal connection as long as there is an established
relationship.' 3' From a practical perspective, this means that legal
parental rights will always be in flux where there is a known donor and
further, that a known donor will retain some residual parental rights at all
times regardless of the understanding of the parties. There is a danger
inherent in legal parental rights acting as a moving target, if for no other
reason than the existence of such a right will also likely dissuade parents
of children conceived through known donors from encouraging a
relationship if their own custody rights might be jeopardized by doing so.
It also seems to confirm the suspicion that a birth parent in an open
adoption retains similar residual rights, but simply does not have legal
recourse to enforce those rights in the same way.
D.

The HardestKind of Case: Surrogacy, Intent, and Biology

The toughest problems arise when competing claims to parental
rights between more than two parents exist, and a conflict presents itself
between competing applications of the intended and intentional parent
paradigm as understood traditionally and as understood within ART. A
Wisconsin surrogacy case highlights the vulnerability of parents who
have no rights
under the traditional iteration of the intended/intentional
32
framework. 1
David and Marcia wanted to have a child, but because Marcia had
been rendered infertile by cancer treatments, they could not have one
without assistance. 133 Monica, Marcia's close friend, who was married
and had five children of her own, offered to act as a surrogate for the
129. Id.
130. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993).
131. Clearly the lack of a biological connection in this situation is a legal fiction
created by the statute itself. Also, this is not to say that such an arrangement might not be
desirable in some circumstances. For the purposes of this conversation, such a right is
troubling because of the uncertainty it may cause.
132. In re Paternity of F.T.R., 833 N.W.2d 634, 637-38 (Wis. 2013).
133. Id. at 637.
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couple. 3 4 The parties agreed to move forward with the surrogacy, with
David providing the sperm and Monica providing the egg and carrying
the child, over Marcia's express concern about Monica being both the
biological and gestational mother.1 35 The couples negotiated an
extensive Parentage Agreement that contemplated Monica voluntarily
surrendering her parental rights after delivering the child and assisting
with the adoption. 3 6 Corey, Monica's husband, simply waived his rights
via the Parentage Agreement. 37 The understanding was that Monica
would have no legal relationship with the child and no placement, but
she would enjoy informal social visits.138 David and Marcia signed the
Parentage Agreement as "Father" and "Mother," Monica
signed as
39
"Husband."'1
as
signed
husband,
her
Corey,
and
"Carrier,"
Just prior to the child's birth, Monica advised David and Marcia
that she no longer was willing to give up her parental rights and that she
would be seeking custody.140 At birth, Monica and her husband Corey
would be the child's legally recognized parents under the law, based on a
traditional understanding of who is an intended parent. Monica would
also satisfy the role of intentional parent; however, her decision to permit
David and Marcia to take the child home from the hospital would have
impacted that designation. 14 1 David would be able to seek paternity as a
biological/intentional parent and challenge Corey's claim to legal
parental status, which presumably Corey would not assert.
David filed suit for paternity and custody of the child shortly after
43
his birth. 42 He also sought enforcement of the Parentage Agreement.1
The circuit court framed the issue as a question of whether it could
compel Monica to assent to an adoption or a termination of her parental
rights based on the provisions contained within the Parentage
Agreement. 44 After determining that it could not so require, the court

134. Id.at 637-38.
135. Id. at638.
136. Id.at 638-39.
137. In re PaternityofF.TR., 833 N.W.2d at 638.
138. Id. Thus, this situation was in many ways similar to an open adoption with the
exception that David was biologically related to the child as well.
139. Id. at 639.
140. Id. at 638.
141. There are too few facts in the court's opinion to surmise whether Corey also
wanted to parent this child. However, depending on the state involved, it would be
possible, in theory, for Corey and Monica to even assert his presumption of paternity as
superior to David's paternity claim, as Corey was married to Monica at the time of the
birth. This claim would have been further complicated by the fact that Corey was sterile
as he had a vasectomy prior to Monica's pregnancy.
142. In re PaternityofF.TR., 833 N.W.2d at 638.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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awarded David primary custody as the biological father, while Monica,
as the biological mother, received secondary custody and limited
visitation based on a standard custody analysis that did not include the
consideration of the parties' intent as expressed in the Parentage
Agreement.1 45 Marcia was not awarded any rights because the Parentage
Agreement was unenforceable and she had no other legally cognizable
claim to the child.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, after accepting review of the
certified question, found that the clause that required Monica to
cooperate with the termination of her parental rights was unenforceable
against Monica. 146 While the court found that both David and Marcia
were the intended parents as that term is understood in ART, the court
also recognized that Marcia had no parental rights under Wisconsin
law. 147 The court found that:
The [termination of parental rights]-and-adoption scheme does not
provide relief for a party in Marcia's circumstance: she is the wife of
the biological father, she currently has no parental rights over the
child, the surrogate/egg donor refuses to voluntarily terminate her
parental rights, and there are no facts in the record to indicate that
there would be grounds to terminate the surrogate's parental rights. 148
Marcia's only rights were those derived from David's paternity
through her marriage. If David died, or if Marcia and he divorced, she
would have no legal right as an intended or intentional parent under the
traditional analysis. A disconnect exists between the ART version of
intended parent and the legal version that actually confers parental
rights.1 49 While the Wisconsin Supreme Court was able to honor the
parties' original intent to some extent by giving primary custody to
David, resulting in the child's placement with the commissioning
145. Id.
146. Id. at645.
147. In re Paternity of F.T.R., 833 N.W.2d at 643, 645. The court further explained
that:
It is clear that the more complex surrogacy relationships do not easily fit into
Wisconsin's statutory scheme. The statutes do not refer to compensation of
surrogate mothers or sperm and egg donors. No provisions address the interests
of the child created in this process or by in vitro fertilization. Thus, parties
seeking relief in Wisconsin courts are provided no guarantee that relief can be
had. Further, circuit court judges attempting to determine if relief is appropriate
are given no guidance on how to apportion that relief.
Id. at 646-47.
148. Id. at 645.
149. Many states, but not all, have resolved this issue by recognizing the validity of
surrogacy contracts or by creating statutes that recognize these relationships. The lack of
such recognition gave rise to the problem presented to the Wisconsin Supreme Court in
this case.
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parents, Marcia remained without parental rights and Monica was able
to maintain rights that she previously contracted away in a situation
where her intention to parent arose after the parties' initial agreement.
While this is similar to traditional adoption to the extent that a birth
mother may change her mind after the birth of her child for a limited
period of time, it is not generally the method in surrogacy, where intent
is presumed to be fixed pre-conception. The traditional limitation of a
two-parent model also has an adverse impact here as the law simply does
not yet recognize the ability to grant legal rights to more than two
parents.
III. RECONSIDERING DELIVERY OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
Individuals, whether intended or intentional parents, known or
anonymous donors, or gestational surrogates, are highly vulnerable to the
legal parental rights and obligations ascribed to them, to the exclusion of
others, by the state. 150 "[T]he significance, universality, and.constancy of
vulnerability mandates that politics, ethics, and law be fashioned around
a complete, comprehensive vision of the human experience if they are to
Clearly, the current model of
meet the needs of real-life subjects."''
legal parentage, as developed through common law, shaped by equal
protection, and promulgated by state statutes (or lack thereof) fails to
protect the vulnerability of those subject to its imposition. The state has
always assigned a shared and bundled set of rights to two legal parents,
and the state has always proceeded from the presumption that the
married woman who gives birth and her husband are the model for the
conferral of those rights and the related privileges. 152 As the model
family becomes myth, the state should seek to craft better relational
models that look to parents' (all parents') expected relationship to a child
instead of parents' relationships to one another.
Different proposals have been made to clarify the confusion created
by adherence to this outmoded model in terms of identifying who may be
a parent and how that identification is made. 53 More specifically,

150. See Martha Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human
Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 10 n.27 (2008) (noting that "vulnerability... is
profoundly shaped by social institutions" and is, to a large extent "socially constructed in
its particularities").
151. Id.at 10.
152. Kisthardt, supra note 1, at 591-92.
153. See, e.g., Melanie B. Jacobs, More Parents, More Money: Reflections on the
FinancialImplications of Multiple Parentage, 16 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 217, 224
(2010) [hereinafter Jacobs, More Parents] ("[D]espite the difficulties of managing

multiple parenthood, children will benefit from greater security from maintaining care
giving relationships and financial security."); Melanie B. Jacobs, Why Just Two?
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scholars have encouraged, and states are beginning to accept, the idea
that a child may have more than two legal parents.1 54 Intent in a
heteronormative model still carries great weight in making these
assessments, even as they clarify the playing field for all those involved.
A.

Fixing Identities and Expanding the ParentalPool

British Columbia has promulgated statutes, housed in the new
Family Act, that seek to identify the intended parent in any birth
scenario, both in traditional conception and ART. 155 The statutes set
forth whom will be afforded legal rights in any given birth circumstance,
and the statutes specifically define the term intended parent. 5 6 The
Family Act also permits more than two persons to receive parental
recognition in certain circumstances. 157 The statute defines and
delineates how parentage is assigned in traditional conception,
heteronormative ART without surrogacy, gestational surrogacy, and
other parental arrangements that would not be covered by the other
definitions. 158 The statute defines "intended parent" as:
[A] person who intends, or 2 persons who are married or in a
marriage-like relationship who intend, to he a parent of a child and,
for that purpose, the person makes or the 2 persons make an
agreement with another person before the child is conceived that...

the other person will be the birth mother of a child conceived through
assisted reproduction, and.., the person, or the 2 persons, will be the
child's parent or parents on the child's birth, regardless of whether
that person's or those persons' human reproductive material was used
in the child's conception. 59
California has also enacted a statute that permits more than two
people to be recognized as a parent. 160 The statue gives the court
discretion in whether to grant legal recognition beyond two parents
depending upon the circumstance and detriment to the child, but that
recognition is not a matter of right for legal parentage.16' The statute was
promulgated in response to a difficult case, In re MC., where the
biological mother was incarcerated, her child was in foster care, and only
DisaggregatingTraditionalParentalRights and Responsibilities To Recognize Multiple
Parents,9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 309, 312 (2007) [hereinafter Jacobs, Why Just Two].
154. Jacobs, More Parents,supra note 153, at 224.
155. Family Law Act, 2011 S.B.C., ch. 25, §§ 20-36.
156. Id. §§ 23-30.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 2 of 2015 Reg. Sess.).
161. Id.
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a legal parent could be involved in the dependency proceedings. 162 In
that case, both the biological unmarried father and the biological
mother's registered domestic partner sought legal rights. 163 While the
court recognized both parties had a legitimate claim under the Uniform
Parentage Act, the court was forced to choose between them. The
California statute sought to resolve the problem and offer more, not less,
protection to children who were at risk based upon the nature of their
parents' relationships. 64 The statute certainly helps resolve difficult
cases, but it is more of a safety net than an affirmative clarification of
parental status due to its discretionary nature. At the same time,
however, California has also promulgated a new statute which allows a
known donor to reinstate parental rights on the basis of an established
relationship that occurs after the known donor has affirmatively
surrendered those rights upon donation that will continue to create
uncertainty for parents who accept reproductive materials from known
donors. 165 In theory, this new statute may extend that right to known
donors to the exclusion of other fathers. What remains to be seen is
whether the interplay between these statutes could permit known donors
to make further reaching claims than anticipated. On the plus side, this
type of statute-that permits multiple legal parents-may help
intentional parents in circumstances where the law leaves them otherwise
unprotected, such as a woman in the same circumstances as Marcia, who
had no legal relationship to her child despite a surrogacy agreement to
the contrary.
B.

RepurposingIntent and Returning to Biology First

Historically, the application of intended and intentional parent
created a hierarchy of who received rights and often ran afoul of equal
protection. 166 Social factors and societal prejudices often overshadowed
simple biological relations that could mean the difference between
having parental rights and having no rights at all. 167 Expanding the pool
of who may be recognized as a parent beyond two parents should, in
theory, solve some of these problems. Where a combination of legal,
biological, and social parents exists-and in some cases commissioning

162. In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856, 861 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
163. Id.
164. Joanna L. Grossman, CaliforniaAllows Children To Have More Than Two Legal
Parents, VERDICT: LEGAL ANALYSIS & COMMENT. FROM JUSTIA (Oct. 15, 2013),
http://verdict.justia.com/2013/10/15/california-allows-children-two-legal-parents.
165. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 2 of 2015 Reg. Sess.).
166. See Kolinsky, supra note 10.
167. See generally Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
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parents-the law will now permit the bundle of rights to be shared, and
the law will become more inclusive.
One wonders, however, if we are simply repackaging the same
biases in a different form. The benefit of relying on and recognizing the
commissioning parents in ART as the "legal parents" naturally gives
some finality and a fixed point in time to assign rights. The rise of ART
and the promulgation of parentage laws to address the process permits
intended parent to take on a new meaning and be used in a clear and
concise manner in determining rights. As Professor Purvis notes:
[U]sing intent as a parentage standard where it can be most easily
identified begins to integrate intent, which solves problems of too
many parents, alongside other parentage rules such as biological
connection, which solves problems of too few parents. Furthermore,
that currently arise with
intent solves many of the tangible problems
68
nontraditionally conceived children.1
However, in traditional conception, the problem remains, as the
concept of intent does not capture the complexities of human
relationships and the evolving embodiment of maternity and paternity as
pregnancy and parenthood progress. In a simplistic way, intent is still
most readily recognized through marriage, and a lack of marriage
requires an affirmative showing of intentionality.
It may be worth considering that the original version of intended
parent, fostered by marriage and gestation, needs to be fully dismantled
in favor of the vertical relationship that exists between parent and child
biologically. Marriage, and the two-parent model, has become an
entrenched asset in terms of bestowing parental privilege and assigning
parental obligations. Traditionally, the intended parent was a proxy for
biological parent. Now that we can accurately determine maternity and
paternity through scientific means, perhaps using biology as the sole
determinant is better. Children's putative parents can submit to a
paternity or maternity test upon the child's birth, and the result will
establish with certainty whether there is a convergence of both biology
and social responsibility. 169 If there is no convergence of biology and
marriage, a married father can decide to accept paternity as a social
father, which will prevent paternity fraud claims later in the child's life
that could potentially be more damaging. 170 Additionally, with the
ability to assign legal rights to more than two parents, a child may have a
168. Purvis, supra note 2, at 212.
169. See Meyer, supra note 2, at 137 (citing June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which
Ties Bind?: Redefining the Parent-ChildRelationship in an Age of Genetic Certainty, 11
WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1011, 1019-20 (2003)).
170. See generally Jacobs, supra note 42.
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social and legal father within the marriage, and a biological and legal
father outside the marriage. No one needs to be the absolute loser in this
circumstance.
Removing the traditional concept of intended parent as a determiner
and using only the legal definition borne of ART would be beneficial in
any birth circumstance. In ART, the biological donors, known or
unknown, will have assigned their biological rights to the commissioning
parents so that legal parentage would be fixed prior to birth."' This
includes any rights a gestational carrier may have. 172 In a non-ART birth
situation, biology would rule, not the relationship between the parents
nor the parents' intent.
Using biology first would mean that a parent is entitled to seek a
relationship with the child unless that parent affirmatively gives up that
right. The right would be surrendered prior to conception in donor cases
and at birth (or hopefully soon thereafter) in traditional conception cases.
But it also means, most likely, removing the presumption that a woman
is incapable of ceding her rights to a child prior to birth, particularly
where her role is solely one of gestation. As a rule, giving this right to
biological parents also fixes their obligations such that they may only
terminate those rights if someone else is willing to undertake the care and
custody of the child in question. 173
Also, while recognizing more than two legal parents is an important
step, an obvious concern would be whether traditional notions of
intended and intentional parenthood will infuse such a determination
with gender bias and heteronormativity or create a hierarchy of rightsmuch as the hierarchy of rights evolved between mothers and fathers in
terms of presumed intent. 174 For example, between a social father,
married to a mother at birth, and the biological father, who should have
custody rights? Should the marriage trump any custody claim from the
biological father in this instance if the presumption is that all three
parents share legal rights? The question is not how will it work when
everyone is in agreement, but how will it work from a conflict
perspective. As David Meyer observed a decade ago, "[a]s law
continues to open up new routes to parenthood and discards its
traditional insistence upon bright-line entry markers such as adoption,
171. See Purvis, supra note 2, at 212; Mary Kate Kearney, Identifying Sperm andEgg
Donors: Opening Pandora'sBox, 13 J.L. & FAM. STUD.215, 224 (2011).
172. Although some scholars have argued for parental-type rights on behalf of
gestational surrogates as well, this Article does not seek to consider whether gestational
carriers have a biological claim to a child.
173. To be clear, the author is not advocating for male abortion nor does she intend to
engage regarding that subject in this Article.
174. See generally Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the Construction of
Parenthood,42 GA. L. REv. 649, 683, 707-08 (2008); Gupta-Kagan, supra note 58.
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marriage, or childbirth, courts will inevitably be called upon to prioritize
the competing values at stake," arguably even when every party has a
legal stake in the outcome. 175 What if there is a best interests challenge?
Should some parents, properly recognized, receive fewer rights? For
example, should Jason Patric receive fewer rights because he initially
chose not to be a parent? Should there be "primary" parents and
"secondary" parents? Should persons who simply qualify as intentional
parents not be entitled to primary custody without a biological
connection or the assignment of those rights to that person by a
biological parent?
The question is whether, in opening the door to more than two
parents, and to perhaps something less than fully shared rights, we
should reconsider the notions of intended and intentional parenthood.
The term intended, at its inception, constituted shorthand for who
planned to raise this child-it assigned and fixed family at birth as a
proxy for paternity, which was not otherwise discernable. But, aside
from biology, the concept represented social responsibility. In the
absence of a biological certainty, the nuclear family became the next best
way to ensure the proper care and custody of children.
Parentage is now assigned with respect to ART because both
biology and social responsibility are evident ab initio. That same
convergence of intended and intentional, once presumed, is actually
present, and the biology can be managed in a way that it cannot be
managed in traditional conception. Removing traditional notions of
intended and intentional parents from the equation helps remove the
roadblocks to definitive identity and importantly, provides stability.
Known donors remain a thorny problem in this analysis because
the courts have allowed back door access to known donors where a
relationship has developed. Thus, intentional parenthood, as a delayed
claim, may now be permitted even though the later intent does not match
the intent formed at the time of conception. In considering this problem,
it is helpful to refer back to open adoption. In open adoption, a mother
gives up less than all of her rights. She retains the ability to have contact
with the adoptive family and in essence becomes a "known donor."
Theoretically, having affirmatively relinquished her rights, she could
never come back and assert parental type rights regardless of the nature
of the relationship she shared with her child. Similarly, when open
adoption occurs in conjunction with a termination of parental rights case,
the parties often agree that some connection and communication remain.
In essence, the court permits more than two parents of the child to be
recognized: the primary parents who will serve the child's needs and the
175. Meyer, supra note 2, at 136.
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birth parents who will remain within the family structure in a limited
capacity. Thus, in considering some of the problems created by using
known donors, perhaps creating an open adoption type relationship with
known donors and requiring judicial recognition of their decision to
assign parental rights is necessary to avoid post-birth behaviors creating
new rights. Because there is a move to permit recognition of more than
two parents, the open adoption concept and the known donor issues may
lend themselves to a hybrid type of custody and care that contemplates
different bundles of rights depending on a parent's status and intent at the
time of conception or birth.
Biology determines if one is a parent. But the law's recognition of
parentage determines whether one may exercise the right to care,
custody, and control of a child. Thus, potential parents are subject to the
method that the state creates to assign rights. At this point, the state
requires that they be assigned in a two-parent package as a bundle of
rights with little variation.
CONCLUSION

The idea that what two persons intend to accomplish when they
engage in procreative sex is knowable is ludicrous. To that extent,
presuming parentage based on their expressed intent or their behavior
becomes problematic when assigning parental rights. The idea that
intention is a fixed notion occurring at only one place at one point in time
is also a fallacy. At a time when society required a way to confirm
biology and to prescribe social responsibility, intent to parent a child
conceived by a woman was presumed based on the fact of her pregnancy
and her marriage to a man who was presumed to be the father of the
child based on their legal relationship. Because our ability to procreate
has moved beyond this two-person heteronormative marital model, our
understanding of the use of intent needs to evolve as well. Courts will
consider what the parties intended whether they should or not. Courts
will consider intent outside of the legal restrictions of what intent means.
Thus, regardless of the definitions provided or the accommodations
made, intent remains a constant in parentage determinations, despite the
fact that the fundamental right, as conceived, simply suggests that one
has a right to the care, custody, and control of one's own children and
does not require one to affirmatively demonstrate intent to do so.
Marriage is no longer a sufficient proxy for intent, and contractual
arrangements do not always capture intent sufficiently either.
As new forms of family are considered and the law evolves to
match modem needs in parent/child relations, the power of intent in the
formation of family should remain a constant consideration such that we
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do not carry the outdated notions of family that may be attached to intent
as it was first conceived forward into new familial forms.

